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Abstract
In this paper, we present a reﬁnement of a Control Flow Analysis aimed at studying information
ﬂow security in the the calculus of Mobile Ambients. The improvements are achieved by making the
analysis be ﬂow-sensitive: the analysis is able to keep track of temporal dependencies of capabilities
application when computing a safe approximation of the run-time topology of Mobile Ambient
processes.
Keywords: Static Analysis, Ambient Calculus, Security, Information Flow.
1 Introduction
In the context of distributed systems, where resources and data are shared
among users located almost everywhere, it is likely that a user gets some
(possibly) malicious programs from an untrusted source on the net and ex-
ecutes them inside its own system with unpredictable results. Moreover, it
could be the case that a system completely secure inside, results to be inse-
cure when performing critical activities such as electronic commerce or home
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banking, due to a “weak” mechanism for remote connections.
These security issues constitute a very interesting workbench to evaluate
the theoretical and practical impact of static analysis techniques. Giving a
way for statically verifying a security property has, in principle, the advantage
of making the checking of the properties more eﬃcient; moreover it allows us
to write programs which are secure-by-construction, e.g., when the performed
analysis is proved to imply some behavioural security properties. As most
non-trivial properties of the run-time behaviour of a program are either un-
decidable or NP, it is not possible to detect them accurately, and some form
of approximation is needed. So, in general, we expect to produce a possibly
larger set of possibilities than what will ever happen during execution of the
program.
The purpose of Control Flow Analysis (CFA) [11] is to statically predict
safe and computable approximations to the dynamic behaviour of programs.
It can be expressed using diﬀerent formulations such as the constraint-based
formalism popular for the analysis of functional and object-oriented languages,
or the Flow Logic style [3,10,14]. As in type systems, Flow Logic makes a clear
distinction between the speciﬁcation of when an analysis proposed solution is
acceptable for a program, and the actual computation of the analysis informa-
tion. By predicting the behaviour of a system, it leads to positive information
also when the system under evaluation does not satisfy the property of inter-
est, whereas the type-system approach is given in terms of prescriptive rules
(a system is either accepted or discarded). In several recent developments it
has been demonstrated that Flow Logic is a robust approach that is able to
deal with a variety of calculi of computation: the lambda-calculus, Concurrent
ML, the imperative object calculus, the pi-calculus [1], the Mobile Ambients
calculus [9,12,13], and the spi-calculus [2].
In [5], we applied the Flow Logic-based control ﬂow analysis proposed in [9]
to verify absence of information ﬂow in processes modelled in Mobile Ambi-
ents [7]. In order to study this problem as much abstractly as possible, the
“pure” Mobile Ambients calculus is considered, in which no communication
channels are present, and the only possible actions are represented by the
moves performed by mobile processes. This allows the study of a very general
notion of information ﬂow which should be applicable also to diﬀerent versions
of the calculus such as, e.g., Boxed Ambients [6], BioAmbients [15], and Safe
Ambients [8]. In particular, a new notion of security boundary [5] has been
introduced to model multi-level security policies in this scenario. Information
leakage may be expressed in terms of the possibility for a hostile ambient to
access conﬁdential data that are not protected inside a security boundary.
With this work, we reﬁne even further the analysis of [5] in order to make
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it ﬂow-sensitive. More speciﬁcally, (i) the solution is a power-set of process
representations, not just a single ﬂat representation; (ii) by tagging new pairs
as active and recording which capabilities are enabled, the analysis keeps track
of temporal dependencies of capabilities application. The implementation of
the reﬁned Control Flow Analysis can be easily integrated to the Banana
tool [4].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the basic terminology of the Mobile Ambient calculus, and brieﬂy report a
Control Flow Analysis aiming at computing a safe approximation of the pos-
sible ambient nestings occurring the run-time execution of a process. Then,
we describe how to formalise multi-level security in the setting of Mobile Am-
bients. In Section 3, we propose a reﬁnement of the analysis in order to make
it ﬂow-sensitive.
2 Background
2.1 The Ambient Calculus
The Mobile Ambient calculus has been introduced in [7] with the main pur-
pose of explicitly modelling mobility. Indeed, ambients are arbitrarily nested
boundaries which can move around through suitable capabilities. The syntax
of processes is given as follows, where n ∈ Amb denotes an ambient name.
P,Q ::= (νn)P restriction | n
a
[ P ] ambient
| 0 inactivity | in
t
n.P capability to enter n
| P | Q composition | out
t
n.P capability to exit n
| !P replication | open
t
n.P capability to open n
Intuitively, the restriction (νn)P introduces the new name n and limits its
scope to P ; P | Q is P and Q running in parallel; replication provides recursion
and iteration. By n
a
[ P ] we denote the ambient named n with the process
P running inside it. The capabilities in
t
n and out
t
n move their enclosing
ambients in and out ambient n, respectively; the capability open
t
n is used
to dissolve a sibling ambient n. Labels on ambients and on transitions are
introduced as it is customary in static analysis to indicate “program points”.
The operational semantics of a process P is given through a suitable reduc-
tion relation → and a structural congruence ≡ between processes. Intuitively,
P → Q represents the possibility for P of reducing to Q through some com-
putation (see also [7]).
For instance, let P1 be a process modelling an envelope sent from venice to
london:
venice[ envelope[ out venice.in london.0 ] | Q ] | london[ open envelope.0 ]
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Initially, envelope is in site venice. Then, it exits venice and enters site london
by applying its capabilities out venice and in london, respectively. Once site
london receives envelope, it reads its content by consuming its open envelope
capability. Finally, process P1 reaches the state: venice[ Q ] | london[ 0 ] .
To express multi-level security policies, information is classiﬁed into dif-
ferent levels of conﬁdentiality. This is obtained by exploiting the labelling of
ambients. In particular, the set of ambient labels is partitioned into three dis-
joint sets: high, low and boundary labels. Ambients labelled with boundary
labels (boundary ambients) are the ones responsible for conﬁning conﬁden-
tial information. Information leakage occurs if, during the execution of the
process, a high level ambient is not conﬁned inside a boundary, thus being
possibly exposed to a malicious ambient attack. For instance, let P2 be an ex-
tension of process P1, in which the envelope contains conﬁdential data hdata
(labelled high) which needs to be safely sent from venice to london.
veniceb1 [ envelopeb2 [ outc1 venice.inc2 london.0 | hdatah[ 0 ] ] ] |
londonb3 [ openc3 envelope.0 ]
In this case, venice, envelope and london must be labelled boundary to protect
hdata during the whole execution. (See [5] for more detail.)
2.2 A Control Flow Analysis for Mobile Ambients
A ﬁrst Control Flow Analysis aiming at modelling the possible nesting of
processes occurring at run-time was proposed in [9]. In the case of Mobile
Ambients, the control structure computed by the analysis is expressed by the
hierarchical structure of ambients, given by the father-son relationship be-
tween the nodes of the tree structure. The analysis was not security-oriented,
thus it did not exploit the information about “secure” nestings inside bound-
aries.
In [5], we proposed a more accurate abstract domain that separately con-
siders nesting inside and outside security boundaries, yielding to a much more
sophisticated control ﬂow analysis for detecting unwanted boundary crossing,
i.e., information leakage. The main idea is to distinguish among nestings ei-
ther protected or unprotected by boundaries. More speciﬁcally, the analysis is
expressed in terms of tuple (IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ), where:
• The ﬁrst and the second component (IˆB and IˆE) are elements of ℘(Lab
a ×
Lab). If process P , during its execution, contains an ambient labelled a
having inside either a capability or an ambient labelled , then (a, ) is
expected to belong to IˆB or IˆE depending on the level of protection of
the nesting (with B standing for Boundary, and E standing for External
environment).
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• The third component Hˆ ∈ ℘(Laba × Amb) keeps track of the correspon-
dence between names and labels. If process P contains an ambient labelled
a with name n, then (a, n) is expected to belong to Hˆ .
The analysis is deﬁned by a representation and a speciﬁcation functions [11].
The representation function aims at mapping concrete values to their best
abstract representation. The representation function collects in IˆB (IˆE) all
the nestings of ambients initially (not) contained in at least one boundary
ambient. It is given in terms of a function βB

(P ) which maps process P into
a triplet (IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ) corresponding to the initial state of P , with respect to an
enclosing ambient labelled with .
The speciﬁcation states a closure condition of a triplet (IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ) with
respect to all the possible moves executable on a process P . It mostly relies
on recursive calls on subprocesses except for the three capabilities open, in, and
out. For lack of space, in Figure 1 we report only the rule for out-capability.
Within the speciﬁcation, the predicate pathB(
a, ) is used to simplify the
notation: it represents an protected path of nestings from ambient labelled
a to ambient labelled , in which none of the ambients is a boundary. The
rule for the out-capability states that if some ambient labelled a has an out-
capability t on an ambient n, that may apply due to the presence of a direct
ancestor ambient labelled a
′
whose name is n, then the result of performing
that capability should also be recorded in either IˆE or IˆB, depending on the
level of protection of the newly generated nestings. The rule is split into three
distinct cases: (i) an ambient exits a boundary, thus moving to an unprotected
environment, (ii) all ambients are protected, and ﬁnally (iii) all ambients are
unprotected. In the ﬁrst case, all the nestings from the moving ambient a to
new protecting boundaries have to be copied in IˆE, since after the out move
they become unprotected. The in and open-capabilities behave similarly.
(out) (IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ) |=
B out
t
n.P iﬀ (IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ) |=
B P ∧
∀a, a
′
, a
′′
∈ Laba :
case ((a, t) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, a) ∈ IˆE ∪ IˆB ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆE ∧
(a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ) =⇒
if ( a ∈ LabaB) then (
a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆE
else (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆE ∧
n
(, ′) ∈ IˆB | pathB(
a, )
o
⊆ IˆE
case ((a, t) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, a) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ)
=⇒ (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆB
case ((a, t) ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′
, a) ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ)
=⇒ (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆE
Fig. 1. Speciﬁcation of the Control Flow Analysis.
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The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in terms of informa-
tion ﬂows. No leakage of secret data/ambients outside the boundary ambients
is possible if in the analysis h (a high level datum) does not appear in any of
the pairs belonging to IˆE .
Example 2.1 Let P3 be a process modelling the fact that conﬁdential data
hdata is inserted inside a secure envelope before, possibly, being sent in the
insecure external environment.
Notice that in the pure Ambient calculus there are not communication
primitives. In the absence of such primitives, the exchange of an envelope
between a Sender (site venice, in our example) and a Receiver may be modelled
as a sequence of out Sender and inReceiver actions, performed by ambient
envelope. In this way envelope moves from Sender to Receiver, where it will
be opened in order to read its contents (ambient hdata, in our case).
venice
b1 [ hdatah[ inc1 envelope.outc2 venice.0 ] | envelopeb2 [ 0 ] | openc3 hdata ]
In this case, ambient hdata behaves correctly with respect to information
leakage since it never exits the boundary venice. However, if we compute the
CFA, we obtain that the pair (env, h) appears in IˆE , env denoting the external
environment, thus leading to a false alarm. 
3 A Flow-Sensitive Control Flow Analysis
The CFA of Section 2.2 is both context and ﬂow-insensitive: it does not con-
sider the temporal order in which the capabilities are executed, and it is not
able to distinguish between blocking and non-blocking capabilities in a capa-
bility path. Consider again process P3 of Example 2.1: in this case, capability
outc2 venice is executed only if capability inc1 envelope has been consumed,
i.e., only when ambient hdata is inside envelope, and consequently the out-
capability is not enabled. On the contrary, the analysis considers also the case
in which the out-capability is consumed, both when ambient hdata is inside
venice (i.e., an old snapshot of the system), and when it is inside envelope
(i.e., the system’s situation after the in-movement).
In order to reﬁne the analysis, so that it recognizes when a capability is
enabled or not (i.e., it is ready to be consumed), and if a pair in IˆB or IˆE
represents either an old snapshot of the system or the current situation, we
enrich the abstract domains by:
• adding a fourth component, L, which is a set of lists of capabilities’ labels.
More speciﬁcally, each list represents an ordered sequence of the capabilities’
labels along a path, thus the head of each list is an enabled capability
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keeping blocked the capabilities in the tail of the list. For example, in
process P3, at the initial state, L = {[c1, c2], [c3]}, with in
c1 envelope and
openc3 hdata both ready to be consumed.
• tagging pairs in IˆB or IˆE with A or NA, denoting if a pair is active or not
(i.e., it occurs, but it cannot be used to generate further nestings since it
belongs to an old snapshot of the system). To this aim, we deﬁne a function
Φ which, given a pair, complements the tag (e.g, Φ((, ′)A) = (, 
′)NA).
For example, in process P3, at the beginning (b1, h)A, but once hdata moves
inside envelope it must change to (b1, h)NA.
The result of the analysis is a power-set of representations of processes:
S = {(IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ,L)}. Also in this case, the analysis is given in terms of a
representation and of a speciﬁcation function. The representation function
collects all the initial nesting among ambients and capabilities, tagging with
A only ambient nestings and the pairs (, t) where t is the label of an enabled
capability. Again, we do not report the whole analysis speciﬁcation. Instead,
we explain how it diﬀers from [5] by considering, e.g., the out-capability (see
Figure 2). The rule for the out-capability states that the capability is con-
sidered only if it is enabled. If this is the case, then the result of performing
that capability should also be recorded in either IˆE or IˆB, depending on the
level of protection of the newly generated nestings. In addition, the tags of
the pairs involved in the movement should be updated consequently, and t
deleted from the head of a list in L.
(out) S |=B out
t
n.P iﬀ S |=B P ∧
∀(IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ,L) ∈ S : if (
t ∈ head(L)) then
∀a, a
′
, a
′′
∈ Laba :
case ((a, t)A ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, a)A ∈ IˆE ∪ IˆB ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
)A ∈ IˆE ∧
(a
′
, n)A ∈ Hˆ) =⇒ Φ((
a, t)A) ∧ Φ((
a
′
, a)A) ∧ top(
t,L) ∧
if ( a ∈ LabaB) then (
a
′′
, a)A ∈ IˆE
else (a
′′
, a)A ∈ IˆE ∧
n
(, ′)A ∈ IˆB | pathB(
a, )
o
⊆ IˆE
case ((a, t)A ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, a)A ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
)A ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, n)A ∈ Hˆ)
=⇒ (a
′′
, a)A ∈ IˆB ∧ Φ((
a, t)A) ∧ Φ((
a
′
, a)A) ∧ top(
t,L)
case ((a, t)A ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′
, a)A ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
)A ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′
, n)A ∈ Hˆ)
=⇒ (a
′′
, a)A ∈ IˆE ∧ Φ((
a, t)A) ∧ Φ((
a
′
, a)A) ∧ top(
t,L)
Fig. 2. Speciﬁcation of the Reﬁned Control Flow Analysis.
The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in terms of informa-
tion ﬂows. No leakage of secret data/ambients outside the boundary ambients
is possible if in the analysis h (high level datum) does not appear in any of
the pairs belonging to any of the IˆE sets in S.
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Theorem 3.1 Let P be a process, h ∈ Laba
H
a high level label, and S =
{(IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ,L)}. Let β
B
env
(P ) ⊆ S, S |=B P , and ∀(
′
, 
′′
) ∈ IˆE , 
′′
= h. Then,
P does not leak secret h.
Example 3.2 Consider again process P3 of Example 2.1. The representation
function gives a snapshot of process P3 in its initial state:
S0 = {{(b1, h)A, (h, c1)A, (h, c2)NA, (b1, b2)A, (b1, c3)A}, {(env, b1)A}, {[c1, c2], [c3]},
{(b1, venice), (h, hdata), (b2, envelope)}
At this point, both inc1 envelope and openc3 hdata are enabled. If the open-
rule is applied, we obtain:
S1 = S0 ∪ {{(b1, h)NA, (h, c1)NA, (h, c2)NA, (b1, b2)A, (b1, c3)NA, (b1, c1)A, (b1, c2)NA},
{(env, b1)A}, {[c1, c2]}, {(b1, venice), (h, hdata), (b2, envelope)}
Now, only inc1 envelope is enabled:
S2 = S1 ∪ {{(b1, h)NA, (h, c1)NA, (h, c2)A, (b1, b2)A, (b1, c3)A, (b2, h)A}, {(env, b1)A},
{[c1], [c3]}, {(b1, venice), (h, hdata), (b2, envelope)}
Finally, none of the capabilities enabled can be consumed, thus the ﬁxed-
point algorithm stops. The two snapshots added to the solution represent two
possible traces of the run-time execution of process P3. Also in this case, the
results should be read in term of information ﬂow: since h does not appear in
IˆE, the analysis correctly veriﬁes that there is no information leakage. 
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